



University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa)
Queen’s University (Canada)
South African Municipal Workers Union
International Labour Resource and Information Group (South Africa)
Canadian Union of Public Employees
This project is funded by the 
Canadian government through the 
























The Legacy of Peronism
A Shift to Neoliberalism
The Process of Privatizing Water
Co-opting Labour
“ There Is No Alternative”
The Bidding Process and Awarding the
Contract
The Regulatory Agency (ETOSS)
Outcomes of the Privatization
Network Expansion
Cost of Water
The Crisis of the “Infrastructure Charge” 






















ABOUT THE PROJECT 
The Municipal Services Project is a multi-year research, policy and edu-
cational initiative examining the restructuring of municipal services in 
South(ern) Africa. The project’s central research interests are the impacts 
of decentralization, privatization, cost recovery and community participa-
tion on the delivery of basic municipal services like water, sanitation and 
electricity to the rural and urban poor. The research has a participatory and 
capacity building focus in that it involves graduate students, labour groups, 
NGOs and community organizations in data gathering and analysis. The 
research also introduces critical methodologies such as ‘public goods’ 
assessments into more conventional cost-benefit analyses. 
Research results are disseminated in the form of these Occasional 
Papers publications, a project newsletter, academic articles and books, 
popular media, television documentaries and the internet. The project 
website is located at www.queensu.ca/msp.
Research partners are the University of the Witwatersrand (Johannes-
burg), Queen’s University (Canada), the International Labour Resource and 
Information Group (Cape Town), the South African Municipal Workers 
Union, and the Canadian Union of Public Employees. The project is funded 
in part by the partner institutions and by the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. 
Acknowledgments:
The authors would like to thank Itzíar Gomez-Carrasco for her translation 
work and insights.  We would also like to thank Daniel Azpiazu, Eduardo 
Basualdo and Martin Schorr of La Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
Sociales (FLACSO) and Carlos Vilas of the Instituto Argentino para el Desar-
rollo Económico (IADE) in Buenos Aires for their assistance in conducting 
the research.  The opinions expressed here remain those of the authors.
ISBN 0-88911-970-8
© 2001 Municipal Services Project
Design and layout: jon berndt DESIGN




Lyonnais des Eaux has come knocking on my door on two occa-
sions.  These French water companies have become too powerful to 
resist.  The take-over is inevitable.  
Interview with a senior water manager, Cape Town, July 2000
As part of its research mandate the Municipal Services Project has been conducting comparative studies on the privatization of municipal services in other parts of Africa and Latin America.  This report presents the findings of a study of the private water 
and sanitation concession in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  This is the first major 
English-language study of the concession conducted outside of the World 
Bank Group since the concession began in 1993. 
 The decision to conduct research on the Buenos Aires water system was 
taken for several reasons.  First, it is one of the largest water concessions 
in the world – servicing a population of 10 million people – and has been 
hailed as a success story internationally.  It is important, therefore, that 
South African policy makers review this model in their own deliberations 
over private sector involvement in water and sanitation delivery.
Second, the major shareholder in the consortium that operates the 
water concession in Buenos Aires is Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, a large 
French multinational that is also active in South Africa.  Lyonnaise des Eaux 
is involved in the Johannesburg water management contract and has been 
actively pursuing contracts in other South African cities, as the opening 
quote to this executive summary attests to.  
Third, there have been at least two trips to Buenos Aires by South 
African policy makers and bureaucrats to review the water concession as 
a possible model for South African municipalities.  The first trip, taken in 
1997 by a councilor and a senior engineer from Cape Town (paid for by 
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LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA: The Buenos Aires Water Concession
inherent power asymmetries that give Aguas Argentinas (the name of the 
private consortium) the upper hand in most of the negotiating processes.
Even the union representing workers has been remarkably silent during 
the privatization process.  Despite the loss of almost half its workforce, 
and the casualization of new hiring, union leadership has been effectively 
neutralized through a lucrative share-option plan which grants employees 
up to 10 percent of the company, and through appointments to well-paid 
positions.  The union has offered no sustained critical opposition to the 
privatization process and has even sent representatives to other countries to 
promote the Buenos Aires water model.   
Rather than becoming more accountable to the public, Aguas Argen-
tinas appears to have entrenched a process of secretive and questionable 
negotiating practices and has made virtually no effort to open itself, and its 
long-term plans, to public scrutiny.  
Efficiency
A second argument made in favour of privatization is that private compa-
nies are more efficient than the public sector, thereby reducing costs to 
the end user and freeing up resources for the state that can be used for 
other development needs.  Once again the water concession in Buenos 
Aires appears to have done the opposite.  Despite an impressive 27 percent 
reduction in water tariffs immediately after Aguas Argentinas took over 
water delivery in 1993, the cost of water has increased by as much 
20 percent in real terms due to subsequent price hikes and surcharges.  
Moreover, the initial price decrease itself was somewhat misleading, with 
critics arguing that prices were artificially inflated by the government prior 
to privatization in order to make the private company look more efficient.
It should also be noted that these price increases, and the costs of 
service extension more generally, have been borne disproportionately by 
the urban poor.  As a result, non-payment rates for water and sanitation 
are as high as 30 percent, with service cut-offs becoming increasingly 
common.  It is generally women and children that bear the brunt of these 
service cut offs with very real health and safety consequences. 
Another concern is that sewerage infrastructure development has not 
kept pace with water delivery expansion (due in part to the fact that water 
delivery is twice as profitable for Aguas Argentinas as sewage treatment).  
Nor has Aguas Argentinas fulfilled its contractual obligation to build a 
new sewage treatment plant.  As a result, over 95% of the city’s sewage 
continues to be dumped directly into the Rio del Plata and households with 
the French government), was extremely positive in its evaluation of the 
concession, arguing that it has been “remarkably successful” in turning 
around an otherwise “potentially disastrous situation” (Bekker and Marsden 
1997, 10).  A second trip taken in May of 2000, involving 12 senior 
local government officials from various parts of South Africa, was similarly 
positive in its review (PADCO 2000).
Our own research findings are much more critical of the concession.  
Although there have been some positive developments in terms of invest-
ments in infrastructure and the extension of services since 1993 there have 
been some major failures as well.  While some of these failures are unique 
to Buenos Aires and the politics of Argentina, they do raise some more 
general questions around the role of the private sector in the delivery of 
municipal services, and challenge some of the widely held arguments in 
favour of privatization.
The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the main findings 
of our research, with a specific focus on the themes of accountability 
and efficiency.  Our intention here is to flag what we consider to be the 
most serious problems with the Buenos Aires water concession in hopes of 
contributing to the ongoing debate over private sector involvement in the 
water and sanitation sectors in South Africa.
Accountability
One of the core arguments made in favour of privatizing municipal services 
is that it generates better public accountability.  The experience of the 
water concession in Buenos Aires, however, has been just the opposite.  
Starting with a Presidential Decree in 1989 which unilaterally declared 
that the city’s water and sanitation would be run by the private sector (an 
announcement made shortly after the declaration of an “economic state 
of emergency” and under apparent pressure from international financial 
institutions), all decisions about the extent and scope of privatization in 
these sectors were made behind closed doors.  There was no public debate 
on the matter, and the first (and only) public consultation did not take place 
until June, 2000, seven years after the concession had begun.  
Of equal concern is the fact that the independent regulator set up 
to monitor the activities of the private company has been effectively 
marginalized by both the firm and by the national government, with the 
latter intervening on several occasions to over-rule decisions made by the 
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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, embarking on a dramatic reversal of his party’s election platform, Argentine President Carlos Menem began a major period of privatization. This marked the beginning of the era of Menemismo economics. Nearly all publicly owned enterprises were sold or given 
over to the private sector to manage, including the water service of Buenos 
Aires, which took the form of a thirty-year concession contract in 1993. 
Within a year, the World Bank was proclaiming the success of the Buenos 
Aires water concession and it soon embarked upon a vigorous promotion 
of the model in other parts of the world. Alongside this, the foreign 
water corporations involved publicized the ‘success’ of their accomplish-
ments in Buenos Aires as part of an aggressive move into water markets 
elsewhere in the world. Since 1994, however, the concession has proved 
far more problematic than the World Bank’s researchers originally thought, 
particularly in terms of escalating costs to the public and environmental 
degradation.
In this paper, we offer a brief overview of the political economic context 
in Argentina, before looking at the process involved in the privatization of 
water in Buenos Aires. We then look at the outcomes of the privatization. 
The research is based on secondary sources as well as a six-week 
period of primary research in Buenos Aires between July and August 
2000. The latter consisted of semi-structured interviews with representa-
tives from the private company, the independent regulator, the International 
Finance Corporation, national and local government, community groups 
and representatives from the main water-sector unions. Secondary sources 
were drawn from academic articles and government documents as well as 
research reports prepared by major donor agencies.  
new water services are often forced to dump their sewage into makeshift 
septic tanks, cesspools or directly onto streets and open fields.  The 
groundwater equilibrium has been destabilized and basements have begun 
to flood, buildings and pavements have started to sink, and water borne 
diseases are a constant concern.  Once again it is the poorest households 
that are most negatively affected.  
The costs of this lack of sewerage investment in terms of environmental 
sustainability, public health and safety, and urban equity in Buenos Aires 
have not been fully measured but certainly bring into question the argu-
ment that the private company is more ‘efficient’ than the former public 
provider.  Nor do the arguments that private companies are able to gener-
ate more capital than the public sector seem to hold in this case.  The bulk 
of the capital used for infrastructure development and new connections 
in Buenos Aires water and sanitation have come from surcharges to end-
users and international financial institutions – financing options that could 
have been available to the public sector.  Meanwhile, Aguas Argentinas has 
been making record profits in Buenos Aires: up to twice the international 
average and up to three times what water companies make in the UK on 
average. 
In the end, it would appear that the private water concession in Buenos 
Aires has done little that a rejuvenated public sector provider could not 
have done, and has in fact exacerbated some of the worst socio-economic 
and environmental problems of the city.  Poor residents, meanwhile, have 
been unable to voice their concerns due to the lack of participatory mecha-
nisms and have taken to expressing their grievances through civil disobedi-
ence (e.g. a community group from Lomas de Zamora that disrupted an 
Aguas Argentinas meeting to pour contaminated water from flooded areas 
on the tables of the company’s executives).  
Whether these problems are merely a question of better regulation and 
monitoring of the company (as World Bank analysts argue), or whether 
these problems are related more broadly to the introduction of profit 
incentives into a previously publicly-run service, are questions that South 
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ing conditions in the country and on July 1, 1974 Peron died of heart 
failure. After his death, his third wife Isabel ruled for a further two years 
before a coup resulted in a new period of dictatorship and the bloodiest 
period in Argentina’s recent history. 
During the so-called “Dirty War” between 1976 and 1983, mass “disap-
pearances” took place, union laws were suspended, torture was common 
and dissent impossible. Anyone labeled a radical was in danger, as the 
paranoid military rulers attacked what they claimed was an underground, 
urban guerilla movement. For a while, mothers were bewildered by the 
disappearance of their sons, before having to accept the appalling reality 
that the military was responsible for their systematic murder. 
The grip of the military began to slip in the early 1980s as the country 
descended further into economic and social crisis. The last of the generals, 
Galtieri, spearheaded a last-ditch attempt to consolidate support by invad-
ing the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. When this ended in defeat, the period 
of dictatorships crumbled. In 1983, Raul Alfonsin was democratically 
elected as a civilian president and a period of civilian reform began. 
However, Argentina’s troubles were by no means over. The debt crisis came 
to the fore and convincingly blocked any of Alfonsin’s attempts to lift 
Argentina out of sharp economic depression in which the country seemed 
to be languishing. High inflation and frequent bouts of hyperinflation 
(reaching levels of over 4,000 percent) led to increasing disillusionment 
with the government’s capacity to act. It began to look increasingly likely 
that military intervention would again be the end-result of the chaos. 
However, the 1989 election saw the return of Peron’s Partido Justicialista, 
recently unbanned and under the new leadership of Carlos Menem. In 
an agreement with Alfonsin, Menem assumed power without the required 
interim period, in order to prevent the growing possibility of serious insta-
bility. He then embarked upon a rapid period of far-reaching economic 
reforms.
A Shift to Neoliberalism
Menem’s reforms marked a dramatic turnaround from the Justicialista’s 
main policy platform. In a cruel twist, the party most closely allied with 
labour was the one that would carry through the harshest reforms. Citing 
the devastating effects of hyperinflation, Menem declared a “state of eco-
nomic emergency” and was thereafter able to make many decisions by 
decree. In response, the union movement went through a bewildering 
period of transformation and fragmentation. Three main factions have since 
THE LEGACY OF PERONISM
In spite of being the second largest economy in Latin America, Argen-tina is languishing in an economic crisis. Spanish colonialism left a profound mark, establishing firmly unequal trade relations with the rest of the world and creating a small elite prepared to work in alli-
ance with foreign interests. In the last decade, neo-conservative economic 
reform and rapid privatization has greatly accentuated inequalities and has 
led to a deepening of Argentina’s dependence on foreign capital.
In the first half of the twentieth century economists confidently pre-
dicted that Argentina would soon be second only to the US in its economic 
strength and stature. In marked contrast, from the 1950s on, political 
instability and economic stagnation have dominated Argentine history. 
Many lay the blame for the disaster of the last fifty years on the policies of 
Juan Domingo Peron, Argentina’s president between 1946 and 1955 and 
for one shorter period between 1973 and 1974. 
Peron attracted mass support in the country through a curious blend of 
socially reformist policies and balancing what appeared to be both leftist 
social change and conservative defense of elite interests. Essentially, he was 
a populist. Realizing that the largest constituency for him to draw upon 
was the working class, Peron granted some considerable concessions to the 
poor and growing middle class. His second wife, the glamorous Evita, who 
rose from the poor barrios of the city to achieve myth-like stature, further 
consolidated the impression that Peronism represented the true interests of 
the working class. Peron did strengthen union power and did, therefore, 
help to strengthen a force for change within the working class, but this 
seems more an act of political opportunism than a genuine effort to 
change power imbalances. David Rock (1987, 257) quotes Peron before 
the Buenos Aires’ stock exchange in August 1944: “Businessmen: Don’t be 
afraid of my unionism. Never has capitalism been firmer than now…What 
I want to do is to organize the workers through the state, so that the 
state shows them the way forward. In this way revolutionary currents 
endangering capitalist society in the postwar can be neutralized”. This 
close association of the union movement with the state has, we would 
argue, been central in aiding the advance of neoliberalism in the 1990s 
as well.
Peron’s first period in power was followed by a succession of coups 
and military dictatorships. Civilian rule was rare and many blamed Peron’s 
rapid realignment of social forces for the climate of political instability. His 
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protests have been focused on the international financial institutions, espe-
cially the World Bank and the IMF. Sometimes, as with Peron, this has 
played on a sense of economic nationalism rather than proposing a radical 
challenge to global capitalism, but the MTA has begun calling for a 
complete non-payment of the foreign debt. The CTA has also participated 
in these calls and has contributed to the rejuvenation of a radical intel-
lectual critique of the so-called “Washington consensus”.  In November 
of 2000, the main dissident labour groups mobilized road blocks and 
yet another national strike in order to oppose the latest round of IMF 
imposed austerity measures. The current political and economic climate in 
Argentina remains tense.
The official level of unemployment in the country lies at 15 percent, but 
if one includes  rural labourers who are not covered by the social security 
system, the urban informal sector, and those who have given up looking for 
work altogether, the figure jumps to over 40 percent (Cieza 1998, 23). The 
official figure has not dipped below 13 percent since 1995 when Menem’s 
reforms began to take effect and, in 1999, the economy contracted by 
3.2 percent. The figures predicted by The Economist for growth in 2000 
languish at 1.5 percent (Anon. 2000a). The current president, Fernando de 
la Rua, has struggled to attain the fiscal surplus demanded by international 
creditors through the cutting of public spending and through increasing 
taxation but the economy has not revived. Meanwhile the costs of services 
under newly privatized entities has increased significantly, along with 
growing accusations of corruption. There appears to be a general loss of 
confidence in the government’s ability to solve the country’s problems. 
THE PROCESS OF PRIVATIZING WATER
In August 1989, the Menem administration rushed through the National Administrative Reform Law (No. 23, 696), declaring a state of economic emergency with regard to the provision of public services. The law authorized the “partial or total privatization or liquidation 
of companies, corporations, establishments or productive properties totally 
or partially owned by the State, including as a prior requirement that 
they should have been declared subject to privatization by the Executive 
Branch, approval for which should in all cases be provided by a Congres-
sional Law” (Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Servicios Publicos 1993, 
4). Through such a decree, Menem was able to privatize the Buenos Aires 
water and sewerage network, Obras Sanitarias de la Nacion (OSN) without 
emerged. The first, the conservative Confederacion General del Trabajo 
(CGT), identifies the most closely with Peronist interests and believes the 
unions to be best served by the Justicialistas in spite of their neoliberal 
stance. The second is a dissident faction of the CGT, the Movimiento de 
Trabajadores Argentinos (MTA). The MTA have achieved some considerable 
success in radicalizing the labour movement around the issue of neoliberal 
restructuring but have tried to do this within a more unified workers’ 
movement. In many ways this has meant that they remain more closely 
associated with traditional Peronism than the other breakaway movement, 
and third main labour faction, the Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos 
(CTA)1. Whereas both the CGT and the MTA are umbrella groups the CTA 
is primarily composed of dissident unions, the unemployed and individual 
members.
Factions aside, this corporatist framework of the past seems largely 
to have been dismantled during the period of Menem’s reforms. Labour 
leaders were still consulted, but it seems to have been little more than a 
means of guaranteeing their co-optation. As Manzetti (1999, 81) writes, 
“in what constituted a watershed in Argentine history, Menem turned the 
traditional confrontation between Peronism and big domestic capital into 
an alliance for profit”. Labour leaders joined this emerging alliance and, as 
unemployment rose to a steady 15 percent in the latter half of the 1990s, 
the labour movement found new ways to survive, in many cases turning its 
attention more to raising revenues in private financial markets rather than 
challenging the government’s economic reform agenda. 
One such revenue-generating opportunity is directly linked to privatiza-
tion in the form of the Programma de Propiedad Participada (PPP) which 
offers employees a 10-percent share in the newly privatized industries; 
shares which are administered by the unions. Murillo (1998, 81) writes 
that: “The privatization of state-owned enterprises had two consequences 
for unions. On the one hand, union dues and welfare funds dropped 
with decreased numbers of members. On the other hand, privatization 
increased the opportunities to generate union resources because it intro-
duced a system of employee ownership administered by unions, and 
opened the possibility for unions to purchase stocks in privatized firms in 
their industries”.  Overall, this process of reform has led to a much smaller 
workforce and radically different priorities for the labour movement. 
After Menem’s successor failed to win the 1999 presidential elections 
for the Peronists, losing to the centre Left Alliance party’s candidate Fer-




LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA: The Buenos Aires Water Concession
had been called in order to block the progress of such reforms. However, 
Menem and Cavallo recognized the levels of support that their party still 
had amongst workers. This meant that union leaders had to be guaranteed 
a seat in the privatization discussions. In order to ensure continued support 
up to and following privatization, the law of administrative reform offered 
employees a 10-percent share in the privatized companies through the 
Programma de Propiedad Participada (PPP).
The key to understanding the union’s co-optation lies in the PPP. As 
Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo (1999, 211) argue in an article for the 
IDB and neoliberal think-tank FIEL3: “Allocating 10 percent of shares 
to workers through the Program for Shared Ownership was intended to 
‘buy’ the consent of former OSN workers for the concession and has 
been a common practice in other privatizations undertaken by the federal 
government”.  They refer to the model as one of “Popular Capitalism” and 
recognize that it has been an effective, if expensive, means of wearing 
down union opposition.  
Although enshrined in law, many workers and union leaders felt intense 
pressure to co-operate in the PPP in order to guarantee their 10-percent 
share. In interviews with the authors in 2000, representatives from SGBA-
TOS spoke of how their support for the process had not only guaranteed 
that they received shares but also that they received payments sooner than 
in sectors opposing privatization.  The strategy of co-optation seemed to 
work and SGBATOS leaders shifted from denouncing earlier privatizations 
of public services to offering their full-fledged support, a process which 
resulted in a halving of their membership through job losses.
Notably, union leaders had veto rights in the privatization process, 
but this power was never used. All decisions were made by consensus, 
including the loss of 3,600 workers.  Because of links with the Peronists in 
power, many of the union leaders at the time were also part of the political 
elite. As one interviewee commented, “There is a large difference between 
union leaders and union members. Leaders are part of the political elite. 
They represent the same interests as those in the various ministries. Every-
one who participated in the privatization process was part of an intimate 
group of friends of the president”.  Carlos Ben, for example, one of the 
directors of the company that now manages the water concession, is a 
former union leader. Similarly, the head of the regulator overseeing the 
concession is a former director of OSN and is expected to ‘police’ his 
former colleagues in this role. The distinction between the union, the 
company directorate and the regulator is often hazy and sometimes non-
public consultation, arguing that it was “urgent” to press on with reforms.  
Further Presidential decrees 2074/90, 1443/91, and 2408/91 stated that the 
privatization would take the form of a “concession”. 
The program of economic restructuring was spearheaded by Finance 
Minister Domingo Cavallo who argued that privatization had become a 
necessary measure to counter hyper-inflation that had reached 4,923.6 
percent in 1989 – “a statistical record which has scarred the national 
consciousness” (Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Servicios Publicos 
1993, 3).  According to Prensa Economica (Anon. 1991: 35) “for Minister 
Cavallo, carrying out the privatization of government-run corporations in 
record time is a must, since the main pillar of his convertibility is a 
fiscal surplus and therefore rests on the inflow of funds arising from the 
privatizations”.
By 1993, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) had been involved in the Argentine water sector for several years, 
the IDB having lent US$90 million to OSN in 1989. Once the government 
announced its law of administrative reform, the World Bank funded and 
appointed a team of private-sector technical and financial consultants from 
the UK to advise on the future of Buenos Aires’ water sector. The World 
Bank was also responsible for recommending and short-listing companies 
after the submission of bids. At this stage, a privatization committee was 
formed, comprising representatives of the Ministry for the Economy and 
Public Works, the Privatization Board, SGBATOS2 (the main water-sector 
union) and OSN.
Once the decision to privatize had been made there was no discussion 
of alternatives. Alternatives within the private sector were discussed but 
these were restricted to questions of whether or not to divide the conces-
sion area into competing concessions (a recommendation of the World 
Bank’s) or whether to divide the network vertically into different services. 
The privatization committee was essentially established to discuss how 
to privatize. Virtually no information was provided to the public, as the 
committee relied on the press publicizing the issues and taking an interest. 
Public input was non-existent until a public hearing took place in June 
2000, seven years after the contract had been signed and two years after 
the second five-year plan was to have commenced.
Co-opting Labour
Labour had provided one of the key sources of opposition to initial 
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The Bidding Process and Awarding the Contract
Once bids were called for the concession and information disseminated 
amongst likely bidders, pre-qualification criteria were stipulated. After this 
process, five companies emerged, though this was soon reduced to four 
as the two main French companies decided to submit a joint proposal. 
The bidding process consisted of two stages.  The first stage required the 
evaluation of a company’s technical proposals. The second stage involved 
an evaluation of their financial proposals. One company failed to qualify.  
Three bidders therefore moved into the second stage, the financial bid, 
which was assessed on who could offer the largest tariff reductions.  Aguas 
Argentinas offered a 26.9 percent tariff reduction; the runner-up a 26.1 
percent reduction. The third bidder’s offer was considerably less at 11.5 
percent. 
On May 1, 1993, Aguas Argentinas signed a contract allowing it to run 
the Buenos Aires sewerage and water network for the next thirty years. The 
present capital stock breakdown of the company is shown in Table 1:
Table 1: Capital Stock Breakdown of Aguas Argentinas 4












existent. Certainly, the collusion of these interests in the process meant 
that the privatization of the Buenos Aires sewerage and water network 
was easier to hurry through and destined to benefit and strengthen elite 
groups.
“There Is No Alternative”
Interviews with key decision-makers also suggested that there was a gen-
eral sense amongst union leaders that privatization was inevitable and that 
fighting against it was futile.  Crucial to this thinking in Argentina was the 
hyper-inflationary crisis which essentially disciplined the population into 
accepting privatization as a solution. The Ministry for the Economy and 
Public Works states in a 1993 document that “the key to these changes 
[privatization] was the realization that the economic model that Argentina 
followed for decades was exhausted. The hyper-inflationary crisis was 
useful to make clear that it was impossible to achieve growth and stability 
on the basis of a regulated economy closed to the outside world, with a 
deficit-ridden public sector operating in many inappropriate areas” (1993, 
3 emphasis added). 
The water sector was, however, not deficit ridden (it actually produced 
a surplus in 1992) and would be considered by many to be an appropriate, 
even vital, area in which the public sector should be involved. This is not 
to say that Argentina’s 1980s economic model was ‘succeeding’ or that 
OSN was doing a satisfactory job.  OSN was suffering from serious under-
investment: unaccounted-for-water (leakage) had reached levels between 
40 and 50 percent; water shortages in the summer months occurred 
frequently; and serious pollution resulted from too few sewerage con-
nections and inadequate sewage treatment. Crucially, 30 percent of the 
population living in Gran Buenos Aires had no access to the water network. 
The service was clearly ripe for major reform. However, such reform was 
not considered outside of the private sector. It seemed there was to be no 
alternative to privatization.  Several interviewees even suggested that in 
the few years prior to privatization the water and sanitation situation was 
intentionally worsened to highlight the ‘inadequacy’ of publicly owned 
services.  It is certainly true that the government increased prices in 
1991 and 1992 in order to smooth the way for public acceptance of 
privatization, something that we deal with in more detail later in the paper. 
Again, TINA thinking (“there is no alternative”) was encouraged through 
the argument at the time that publicly owned companies unnecessarily 
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Sources: Jasperson (1997), Concession Contract, Aguas Argentinas (2000)
Of the 2,580,000 (30 percent of the population) not connected to the 
water network in 1993, 95 percent obtained water from individual wells 
with pumped or manual motors (Abdala 1996). For those not connected 
to the sewerage network, 88 percent disposed of sewage through septic 
tanks and cesspools and the remainder disposed of it directly into rivers, 
streams or the ground. This latter activity, in conjunction with poor quality 
cesspools and industrial pollution, has led to serious pollution of shallow 
groundwater aquifers from which those not connected to the water network 
obtain their drinking water. Environmental health risks in poorer areas of 
the city have worsened.
The Regulatory Agency (ETOSS)











The area served by Aguas Argentinas consists of the Federal Capital area 
of Buenos Aires in the downtown core and 17 surrounding municipalities 
(please refer to accompanying map). Originally only 14 municipalities 
were served but expansion has since taken place through the inclusion of 
the municipality of Quilmes and the creation of three municipalities within 
Moron (formerly only one municipality). (See Table 2 for a breakdown of 
coverage and performance levels at the start of the concession.) Water is 
purified in the San Martin and the General Belgrano plants, the former 
being considerably bigger and among the largest of its kind in the world. 
Sewage is currently treated in two separate plants in the southwest and 
the north of the city. There are significant disparities between the levels of 
coverage in different areas of the city. In general, the south of the city has 
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OUTCOMES OF THE PRIVATIZATION
To assess the outcomes of the concession it is necessary to look first at the performance targets stipulated in the original conces-sion contract.  In assessing the outcomes, it should be noted that considerable confusion surrounds these original targets.  Different 
sources produce drastically different numbers. To a large extent we have 
relied on the company’s figures as these are the most up-to-date. However, 
some biases are evident in these figures and where this is clearly the case 
we specify so. Confusion also prevails in that the company’s first “five-year 
period” was extended to the year 2000 (a seven-year period in which to 
fulfill some of the criteria). This extension was granted partly because of the 
renegotiation of the contract in 1997 and partly because of difficulties in 
agreeing on regulatory measures. The second five-year plan was still being 
negotiated at the time of writing.
Network Expansion
Since signing the contract, Aguas Argentinas claims to have increased the 
number of clients receiving water by 1,500,000. This figure includes the 
expansion of the concession area to the municipality of Quilmes in 1995 
and, therefore, the addition of 650,000 new users, many of whom were 
already connected to the water and sewerage networks (see Table 2 for 
the population covered in 1993). A better measure is the percentage of 
the total population covered by the network. As Table 3 demonstrates, 
water coverage at the start of the concession was 70 percent and sewerage 
coverage 58 percent.7  By 1999, Aguas Argentinas claims that water cover-
age had reached 82.4 percent and sewerage coverage 61 percent (Aguas 
Argentinas 2000).
These are significant increases and the figures for water coverage meet 
the performance targets of 81 percent for the first five-year period. Sewer-
age coverage, however, has not increased at the same rate and the figures 
for this fail to reach the 64 percent specified in the contract. Most impor-
tantly, the level of sewage treatment has barely increased in the first seven 
years of operation.  According to interviewees, the level of primary and 
secondary sewage treatment is still hovering at about five percent. In other 
words, although the network of sewerage has expanded, very little of the 
sewage that is being collected is being treated.  Most of it is simply being 
dumped raw into the Rio del Plata via a 2.5-km-long outlet pipe. The 
environmental implications of this neglect are serious and are taken up 
later in the paper. What is important to note here is the complete failure of 
an independent regulatory agency, Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios 
Sanitarios (ETOSS).  ETOSS was established to monitor the quality of 
service, represent consumers, and ensure the implementation of the con-
tractual agreements. Members of its board of directors are appointed from 
the municipal level (appointed by the mayor of Buenos Aires), from the 
provincial level (appointed by the governor of the province), and also 
from the national level (appointed by the president). ETOSS’ annual budget 
of US$8million is drawn almost entirely from a universal 2.7 percent 
surcharge on water bills.  There are approximately 110 people working for 
ETOSS (up from what was originally around 70), most of whom are former 
OSN employees. 
The regulator has been criticized on many fronts and from many differ-
ent perspectives. Some feel that it has been co-opted by the private sector. 
It became clear from interviews that many had strong suspicions that some 
personnel may have even been bribed into overlooking certain aspects of 
the company’s failure to meet contractual obligations. In contrast, those 
interviewed from Aguas Argentinas felt that ETOSS had been unnecessarily 
tough on the company’s operations. The regulator was viewed as more of 
an obstacle to service delivery than a crucial part of a good water system. 
One representative from Aguas Argentinas commented that the company’s 
“harsh treatment” was based on personal jealousies arising from colleagues 
“left behind” at the regulator after privatization. 
Researchers for the World Bank have criticized ETOSS for being too 
“political” (Alcazar et al. 2000). This criticism stems from the fact that deci-
sions are frequently delayed by ETOSS, as a consensus must be reached 
amongst the competing interests of the six member board. These decisions 
regularly go beyond deadlines and there is frequently difficulty finding 
agreement even between two representatives from the same level of gov-
ernment. More alarming, however, is the lack of respect the government 
has had for ETOSS. As will be shown later in the paper, decisions made 
by the regulator that appear to threaten the dominance of private capital 
are frequently overridden by the state, to the extent that government 
rewrote the contract in 1997 considerably softening many of Aguas Argen-
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via loans from the IFC and new surcharges to consumers, finance vehicles 
which could have been equally accessible to a publicly owned water 
entity. 
Cost of Water
The most frequently cited benefit of water privatization in Buenos Aires 
is the reduction in price to end users, demonstrated by the 26.9 percent 
tariff reduction implemented at the very beginning of the concession. Sup-
porters also point to the terms of the initial contract which stipulate that 
prices should only be reduced in the first ten-year period. It would seem, 
therefore, that the privatization process has guaranteed access to cheaper 
water in Buenos Aires.  
On closer examination, however, this is not the case.  In fact, the 
current president of Argentina, Fernando de la Rua, speaking in March 
1999 when he was mayor of Buenos Aires, stated that, “Water rates, which 
Aguas Argentinas said would be reduced by 27 percent have actually risen 
a total of 20 percent” (Anon. 2000b).  The following paragraphs attempt to 
unpackage the confusion. 
In February 1991, after OSN had been earmarked for privatization, a 
25-percent tariff increase was announced. This increase, it was said, was 
to compensate for inflation, as was the 29 percent increase in April of the 
same year.  In April 1992, a goods and services tax was then added to 
water bills. Initially this was set at 18 percent, later increasing to 21 percent 
in April 1995. A further eight-percent increase was granted a few months 
prior to privatization (Ferro 2000, 10). The effect of these increases was to 
allow the company to offer what seemed to the public to be a 27-percent 
decrease in costs, even though in reality it was a manufactured reduction. 
As consultants to the IDB state, this was a useful strategy for stemming 
possible opposition to the privatization process (Wenyon and Jenne 1999, 
198). 
A similar strategy is reported on, and recommended to other govern-
ments, by Mark Dumol, a Filipino government official, in a World Bank 
publication on the Manila water concession. Dumol (2000, 42) writes, in 
a chapter entitled “Need to have bids lower than the existing water tariff”, 
that “In August 1996, about five months before the bid submission, the 
water tariffs were increased by about 38 percent. This tariff increase was 
actually long overdue and would have been implemented regardless of 
privatization….Nevertheless, it gave us a substantially greater chance that 
the bids would be lower”.  Dumol also states that the importance of this 
Aguas Argentinas to meet its sewage treatment targets, which should have 
been at 64 percent for primary treatment and seven percent for secondary 
treatment by the end of the first five-year period.
Table 3. Aguas Agentinas’ Five Yearly Performance 
Targets
Source: Concession Contract, Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995, 39)
The expansion of water coverage through new investments has been 
more successful and has received considerable acclaim from lending agen-
cies. Alcazar et al. (2000, 42), for example, argue that the company’s 
investment record has been “impressive”. They admit that investment has 
not met the levels committed to, but that “as a result of this investment 
new [water] connections increased by 11 percent over the five years and 
coverage increased from 70 percent of customers in the service area in 
1992 to 83 percent by 1997”.9  In regard to the actual size of the network, 
Aguas Argentinas has expanded water pipelines by 1,700 km and the 
sewerage network by 300 km (Aguas Argentinas 2000). Much of the old 
network has also been rehabilitated and cleaned. Water production has 
also increased through initiating some fairly basic repairs at the San Martin 
water treatment plant. 
These improvements are impressive, but had adequate funding been 
made available to the public sector in the early 1990s there is no reason 
to believe that similar reforms could not have been made by the OSN. 
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increase being charged for consumption, disconnection and reconnection, 
and a 42-percent increase in the infrastructure surcharge. 
That ETOSS should grant this increase is confusing in several respects. 
First, it was awarded on the basis of what the extension would cost Aguas 
Argentinas on a once-off basis. Presumably the work would be finished 
in, at most, a few years time, but the tariff increase would still hold, 
providing the company with additional revenues long after the work was 
complete. Second, by granting Aguas Argentinas guaranteed revenues, the 
government has, in effect, nullified the raison d’être of privatization by 
killing any entrepreneurial incentive for the company to finance its own 
extension work to create new customers. In fact, the incentive for the 
company now is to bank the tariff increases and earn interest while 
delaying the cost of extensions for as long as possible.  As Rivera (1995, 
52) notes, “it has been estimated that its savings in costs from delaying 
the Berazategui wastewater treatment plant are about $100,000 per day”. 
Finally, as Artana et al. (1998, 21) state, the Buenos Aires concession was 
considered to be the most profitable water concession in the world, with 
rates of return approaching 40 percent. To demand a price increase and 
surcharge under these highly profitable conditions is problematic at best.  
What was really required was tighter regulation on the part of ETOSS to 
ensure that necessary re-investments were made.
Most significant of all, perhaps, is that these price increases in the first 
five years set a dangerous precedent. They implied that the contract was 
negotiable and that the company could push for tariff increases whenever 
it wished to, particularly if they could show that new demands were extra-
contractual and had to be paid for by the consumer. As a result, the tariff 
increase also had the effect of shifting the cost of expansion from the 
private sector to end users. 
The Crisis of the “Infrastructure Charge” and the Intro-
duction of the SUMA
The introduction of an Infrastructure Charge at the start of the concession 
has also proven to be highly problematic. Originally intended to finance 
the company’s expansion plans, this surcharge was specifically directed 
at those newly connected to the network, the argument being that these 
consumers were the ones directly benefiting from the expansion. The 
charge frequently affected those least able to pay, however, as these 
households were more likely to not have had a previous water or sewerage 
connection. 
price hike prior to privatization was learned from the Buenos Aires water 
concession. 
It is useful to note here as well that the Argentine government acted in 
the same manner with the privatization of the state telephone company, 
ENTEL. In this instance Maria Julia Alsogaray, the trustee for ENTEL, 
attempted to raise tariffs by 2,300 percent in the first quarter of 1990 and 
guaranteed bidders a net profit margin of 16 percent for the first two years 
after privatization (Manzetti 1999, 109). Though Alsogaray was overruled in 
this case, a 700-percent increase in charges was still permitted prior to the 
privatization of ENTEL (Azpiazu 1999, 366).
Since the 1993 ‘cost reduction’ in water, the cost for services was 
increased in both 1994 and 1998. Additional charges were added in both 
cases and the renegotiation of the contract in 1997 allowed for a significant 
revenue generator for the company in the form of a universal surcharge, 
the SUMA (Servicio Universal y Medio Ambiente, meaning “universal 
coverage and the environment”). 
Why these price increases were permitted by the regulator is unclear. 
According to the original contract, prices may be adjusted according to a 
mix of “price cap” and “cost plus” pricing regulation with prices subject to 
adjustment every five years, in line with the company’s investment plans. 
Prices can therefore go up or down, except in the first five-year period, in 
which they were already fixed as well as in the second five-year period, 
in which the contract stated that prices can only go down. This means that 
in the first ten years no increases should be permitted by the price-cap 
system. 
Between these five-year periods, however, prices can be adjusted accord-
ing to the company’s composite cost index. If costs for the company rise 
above seven percent then it can file for an increase. The index itself is 
based on ten cost categories such as fuel, chemicals, electricity, labour, debt 
service and so on, and the relative value of each of these is assigned a 
weight according to each of the five-year plans (Alcazar et al. 2000, 28-29).
These contractual agreements would imply that the price increases from 
1993 to 1999 must have been the result of an increase in the company’s 
cost index. This is not the case, however, for the 1994 increase.  The 
1994 increase was granted because of what the company argued to be 
extra-contractual demands: ensuring immediate service provision in very 
poor neighborhoods and accelerating the expansion schedule for one of 
the municipalities. The company argued that the new demands by govern-
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therefore seen to be directly snubbing the independent regulator, and the 
consequences proved serious.
A new agreement was eventually reached in 1998 with the introduction 
of a universal surcharge, the aforementioned SUMA. This US$3 surcharge 
(paid bi-monthly) is divided into two parts with US$1 going to environmen-
tal clean-up and US$2 going to extending services to new users. Though 
allowing for cross-subsidization, the SUMA came as a shock to many 
consumers, being regarded as the equivalent of a water ‘poll tax’. This 
led to the Defensor del Pueblo (ombudsman) for Buenos Aires challenging 
the charge in court. At first, the court conceded that the introduction of 
this surcharge was illegal but Minister Alsogaray appealed and the charge 
stayed in effect.  Since the introduction of the SUMA, expansion of the net-
work has continued, albeit at a much slower pace, and the environmental 
clean-up is scheduled to take place in the company’s integral sanitation 
plan (PSI). 
The introduction of the SUMA raises some other troubling questions.  
In his submission to the public hearing on the concession in June, 2000, 
Americo García, Jr. (son of the late Senador García and a member of the 
Senate’s administrative staff) pointed to some inconsistencies in the SUMA 
and the expansion plans presented by the company. Within five years, the 
SU element of the SUMA (i.e., the universal coverage) will raise US$312.8 
million. A further charge on members of the public to be incorporated into 
the sewerage network (the CIF) will bring the total up to US$340.4 million. 
The company’s investment plans, however, are only in the order of US$450 
million, meaning that the company is only going to invest US$100 million 
of its own money over the five-year period. (This, incidentally, is a 
level of investment that OSN, the original public sector water provider, 
could easily have managed.) With regards to the MA element of the 
SUMA (i.e., the environmental component of the surcharge), an additional 
US$156.4 million will be raised over the five-year period. However, the 
company’s investment plans in the PSI (its key environmental plan) were 
only US$142.2 million.12
García also highlighted in his submission further charges introduced 
by Aguas Argentinas, in particular the OPCT which is paid by residents 
wishing to accelerate their connection to the network. Residents are given 
the option to pay for works to be done sooner than they would ordinarily. 
In many instances, García claims, connections are delayed until the OPCT 
is paid, making it a “subversive” infrastructure charge. 
Another fundamental difference in the government’s re-drawing of the 
The Infrastructure Charge ranged from US$43 to US$340 for water 
(depending on the total property area and taking into account the type of 
soil and level of repair needed to streets and sidewalks) and a flat charge 
of US$572 for sewerage. In addition to this, a connection fee was also 
charged. Water services cost an additional US$6 every two months, plus 
tax. Not surprisingly, many households were simply unable to pay such 
costs.10  Pirez (1998, 2000), quoting figures from Ambito Financiero, writes 
that: “Already facing constraints to its survival, the population has become 
increasingly skeptical about its continued access to services. Information 
in the media suggests that some users are abandoning essential privatized 
utilities such as water; it is estimated that 30 percent of the population 
which was incorporated following the recent expansion of the network has 
stopped paying”.
Aguas Argentinas’ inability to collect these fees from the poor quickly 
led them to call for a renegotiation of the contract. The company argued 
that revenues after three years of the concession were US$217 million 
lower than expected, in large part because of the non-payment of the Infra-
structure Charge. They also demanded that the regulator, ETOSS, suspend 
some of the fines for its failure to meet the 1994 accelerated investment 
targets. 
It must be remembered at this point that Aguas Argentinas was reaping 
large profits from the concession. A report from the Universidad Argentina 
de la Empresa stated that profits in 1995 were 28.9 percent of revenues, 
in 1996 they still reached 25.4 percent and in 1997 they were 21.4 
percent. This compares with average profit rates in the water sector in 
England and Wales (often cited as the model of privatization), which aver-
aged 9.3 percent in 1999-2000 and 9.6 percent in the year preceeding 
(OFWAT 2000).11 Yet Aguas Argentinas still argued it to be necessary 
for its contractual obligations to be weakened and for new tariffs to be 
introduced in order to increase revenues. In this instance, the government 
assumed responsibility for the negotiations and a team of engineers was 
appointed around the Minister for Natural Resources and Human Develop-
ment, Maria Julia Alsogaray. Alsogaray’s appointment was justified by the 
government by claiming that it wanted to use the renegotiations to address 
environmental concerns, including measures to reduce contamination of 
the Matanza and Riachuelo rivers (Alcazar et al. 2000, 37). However, the 
team of engineers assigned to the project lacked experience and the close 
knowledge of the concession that ETOSS had developed over the previous 
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football matches in France in 1998. Though no concrete evidence was 
provided to this effect, there would appear to be growing concern around 
the issue of corruption. And, as Alsogaray’s name becomes increasingly 
tarnished with other scandals, several interviewees stated that it is only 
a matter of time before the anti-corruption office links her to improper 
dealings with Aguas Argentinas.
Corruption charges also haunt most of the world’s top ten water corpo-
rations, with Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, Vivendi and their subsidiaries being 
amongst the worst offenders (both of them and their subsidiaries being 
involved in Buenos Aires). Vivendi, for example has faced no less than six 
separate corruption cases. Suez Lyonnaise and one of its subsidiaries have 
been charged with tampering with water pricing in Indonesia, illegally 
introducing “entrance fees in St. Etienne in France, and having paid the 
Mayor of Grenoble up to US$6 million in ‘gifts’ during a period in which 
the town’s water bills went through a three-fold increase” (Council of 
Canadians 2000). Sue Hawley (2000, 1) writes that, “If corruption is grow-
ing throughout the world it is largely a result of the rapid privatization 
(and associated practices of contracting out and concessions) of public 
enterprises worldwide. This process has been pushed by Western creditors 
and governments and carried out in such a way as to allow multinational 
companies to operate with increased impunity”. Many of those interviewed 
felt this to be the case in Buenos Aires.
Environmental Effects
In spite of arguments from the World Bank and the IFC that privatization 
would ensure the necessary investments for environmental clean-up opera-
tions (see, for example, Idelovitch and Ringskog 1994, Rivera 1996 and 
Jasperson 1997), very little has been invested in this critical area. In field 
interviews, the environmental situation in Buenos Aires was continually 
cited as the area most ignored by Aguas Argentinas. One of the main 
concerns is the lack of sewage treatment. As noted earlier, at the start of 
the concession, only four percent of collected sewage was going through 
primary and secondary treatment and this has barely increased to five 
percent. Perhaps even more worrying is that only 58 percent of the popula-
tion of Buenos Aires was connected to the sewerage network at the 
start of the concession and this too has only increased nominally to 61 
percent. Uncollected sewage is being disposed of in septic tanks, cesspools 
or directly into rivers and streams. As a result, surface water supplies 
(especially the Matanza and Riachuelo rivers) are seriously contaminated, 
contract is that Aguas Argentinas is permitted to charge prior to conducting 
extensions to the network, thereby further reducing the company’s expo-
sure to financial risk as well as reducing the regulator’s leverage to ensure 
that work is carried out. This pre-payment system has now become an 
incentive for the company to delay investments as long as possible. 
Two other changes to the contract are also important to mention here. 
The first is a shift from a price-cap system of tariff increases to what Alcazar 
et al. (2000, 40) describe as “rate of return regulation” in that “the new 
rules require the regulator to evaluate the impact of regulatory changes on 
the company’s level of indebtedness”. The second change is a clause which 
offers Aguas Argentinas protection of revenues in the event of a devaluation 
of the peso. Though illegal under the country’s convertibility laws, this 
clause means that devaluation could result in crippling water bills for the 
vast majority of those living in Buenos Aires
This renegotiation proved decisively that the government was not pre-
pared to fine the company for its failure to meet targets. Moreover, it 
showed the alarming lack of respect the government had for the original 
contract. The consequences of this renegotiation immediately played them-
selves out when, in 1998, emboldened by its previous ability to garner 
tariff increases, Aguas Argentinas called for a further 11.7-percent increase, 
something it claimed to be a “cost pass through”. The directors of ETOSS 
representing the Mayor of Buenos Aires fiercely opposed this increase, 
arguing that Aguas Argentinas’ figures were fictitious. ETOSS finally agreed 
to a 1.6-percent increase but the national government intervened once 
again and ordered a 4.6-percent increase in tariffs. The regulator was 
left humiliated. A further tariff increase of 15 percent over the period 
2001-2003 was also granted by the government at the end of 2000. 
This was said to reflect the announcement of new investment levels of 
US$1,006 million for the second five-year period. 
Corruption
Many of the people interviewed for this research suggested that attempts 
to buy the support of both the regulator and the government were not 
uncommon. The fact that the minister in charge of the 1997 tariff renegotia-
tion, Maria Julia Alsogaray, has been tried for accepting multi-million dollar 
bribes in the privatization of the Buenos Aires port system only raises 
suspicions further. Several interviewees suggested that the cost of the 1997 
renegotiation was in the multi-million dollar range. Others stated that the 
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One municipal councilor who spoke out at the public hearing in June 
2000, and who is responsible for infrastructure works in his municipality, 
complained that 50 percent of the work his department does is caused by 
these high (and rising) water tables.  This, he said, was the responsibility 
of Aguas Argentinas and a sign of its “disregard for the true needs of the 
municipalities”. In fact, this subject ignited some of the most heated and 
angry exchanges at the public hearing. It has also become a point around 
which many consumer groups are rallying, in spite of the company’s 
denial of responsibility (Picolini 2000). Community groups from Lomas 
de Zamora, for example, disrupted one of Aguas Argentinas’ meetings in 
order to pour contaminated water from flooded areas on the tables of the 
company’s executives.
In addition to the sewerage extension problem, the present sewerage 
network is incapable of dealing with its own levels of sewage. Tide-
controlled sewage outlets (espiches) are still being phased out even though 
this was demanded several years ago. An expansion of sewage treatment 
facilities is desperately needed (and again required by the contract) but the 
plans for this seem to change too frequently for interviewees to be able 
to comment on whether they will be built or not. In many of the poorer 
areas of the city there are serious problems with sewerage pipes backing 
up because of the low capacity of the present network.  The poorest 
households have been most negatively affected by this neglect, whether it 
be by their homes being flooded by rising groundwater levels or through 
the contamination of aquifers.
Labour
Since the concession came into operation the workforce in the water sector 
has been roughly halved from 7,600 employees to 4000. These layoffs were 
largely conducted through voluntary early retirement schemes, the first 
being jointly funded by the government and Aguas Argentinas, the second 
being paid for solely by Aguas Argentinas. The company argues, however, 
that 15,000 new jobs have been created around the concession on a sub-
contracting basis and in other sectors. This figure has been criticized as a 
wildly ambitious company estimate, but it does serve to demonstrate the 
importance of sub-contracting, or, as Cieza (1998) puts it “the proliferation 
of ‘garbage contracts’”. Such jobs are non-unionized and do not have to 
conform to the same health and safety standards fought for by the main 
water-sector union. These new jobs have also been criticized for contribut-
ing to a general weakening of union organizing across Buenos Aires. 
posing a substantial health risk. 
As outlined in Table 3, an ambitious plan was set out in the original 
contract for the expansion of the sewerage network and for rapid increases 
in primary and secondary treatment of sewage. Since signing the contract, 
however, Aguas Argentinas has failed to provide concrete plans for sewage 
treatment investments and has failed to meet any of its first five-year targets 
for sewerage network expansion.  One interviewee described how the 
company had provided the regulator with four revisions of its environmen-
tal plans (in the form of the PSI) within the space of one month. This, he 
said, meant that they had become “a moving target”, virtually impossible 
for ETOSS to regulate. 
One of the starkest examples of Aguas Argentinas’ environmental mis-
management lies in the problem of the “napas”. This refers to the problem 
of a rising water table which has had some serious consequences for low-
lying areas since the start of the concession. A report prepared for the 
public hearing on the concession in June 2000 cites three primary causes 
of the problem: the influence of hydrological cycles; human settlement 
in low-lying areas; and the transfer of water from the Rio del Plata to 
the aquifers on which Buenos Aires sits. This final point is linked to the 
rapid expansion of the water network with the concomitant neglect of the 
sewerage network (Saltiel 2000). Uncollected waste water is draining into 
overflowing aquifers, instead of being carried for treatment or at least for 
dumping in the Rio del Plata. 
In the past, OSN committed itself to extend the sewerage network at 
the same rate as it extended the water network. Now the two services 
are no longer linked by Aguas Argentinas, a point dramatically shown in 
the figures for extensions to the water network (1700 km since 1993) in 
comparison to the figures for extensions to the sewerage network (300 
km). The company’s argument for this has been the urgency to extend 
the water network to areas where people are still drinking from nitrate-
contaminated waters (an ironic response, given that the reason for these 
nitrate-polluted waters is the lack of sewage treatment). A more truthful 
reason for extending water and not sewage may lie in the different costs 
for the two services.  It is roughly twice as expensive to remove and treat 
sewage from a household than it is to bring treated water to a household.  
Meanwhile, the tariff for sewerage services (not connection costs) is the 
same as it is for water.  Aguas Argentinas have pursued the more profitable 
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CONCLUSIONS
To claim, as Aguas Argentinas does, that the water concession has aided in the alleviation of poverty in Buenos Aires is misleading. Although there have been some impressive gains in the extension of water infrastructure, the majority of the concession’s negative 
impacts have been most deeply felt in the poorest sections of Buenos Aires. 
Many poor households have fallen into serious arrears and have been 
disconnected from the network, especially prior to 1998. Exact figures 
on the number of disconnections could not be found,13 but if, according 
to Pirez (1998, 220), 30 percent of those newly connected had stopped 
paying by 1996, it is likely that disconnection rates would be approaching 
that figure.14 
Environmentally, those living in the poorest areas of Buenos Aires have 
also been faced with the negative effects of rising groundwater (worsened 
since 1998) and the health risks associated with nitrate-contaminated 
aquifers. These municipalities have some of the lowest average incomes in 
the Greater Buenos Aires area and yet a large part of the financial burden 
for extending the network has fallen on these households. 
The argument that privatization is the only way to generate sufficient 
capital for service improvements and extensions is also misleading in the 
case of Buenos Aires. Although capital investment has increased since 
privatization, the main reasons for the increases have been higher sur-
charges and higher debt burdens (which the former public sector company 
could have managed). It should also be remembered that a significant 
portion of these new surcharges is generating additional profit for the 
company.
Power relations shifted dramatically within Buenos Aires in the 1990s 
and the water concession was a contributing force. Elite international and 
national groups have gained, whilst poor groups have lost. Whereas under 
OSN there was a vestige of accountability, in that elected representatives 
had some control over appointments within the company, this seems 
largely to have faded after privatization. ETOSS was seen as the needed 
independent regulator for monitoring performance levels and ensuring that 
the company abides by its contractual obligations, but ETOSS has proven to 
be largely toothless in a process in which elite groups in government and 
the private company (and to some extent in the union) make their decisions 
amongst themselves. As one representative from ETOSS commented, “the 
government turns first to the private company if there is a problem, not to 
the regulator”. The role of the independent regulator would appear to be 
Whilst the main water-sector union, SGBATOS, is struggling to ensure 
the unionization of these jobs, it seems an impossible task, with many 
contracts lasting only between three and six months. 
The actions of SGBATOS have also become somewhat problematic, 
acting as it was as a full supporter of the privatization process, and with 
the head of the union holding a key position within the privatization 
committee. Since privatization, the union has itself become something of 
a neoliberal ‘success story’, co-editing publications with the World Bank 
and visiting other countries whose water systems have been targeted for 
privatization in order to promote its benefits for labour. 
Representatives from both SGBATOS and FENTOSS argued, in field 
interviews, that their role shifted in the 1990s from being antagonistic 
to capital to fulfilling a more “social position”, in which they provide 
health-care plans, re-training programs and private pension plans for their 
members. Indeed, it would appear that both health and safety standards 
and other benefits for unionized workers have improved under the private 
company. But with official unemployment hovering at around 15 percent 
(and unofficial employment as high as 40 percent) the union’s claim that 
the traditionally antagonistic relationship to capital had to be shelved in 
order to serve the “wider community interest” rang hollow for some of the 
people we interviewed who see the union as solely serving the interests 
of a narrow working elite. 
SGBATOS has become a good example of what is termed in Argentina a 
sindicato-empresa, or union-business. Its headquarters are based in a glass-
fronted, air-conditioned building in a wealthy residential area of the city. 
Its training facilities are impressive, a result of the union’s ability to garner 
funds through the PPP. (During our visit, the ‘training’ session consisted 
of a six-hour audiovisual display on the legacy of Peron.) When asked 
if they were distinguishable from the private company anymore, the vice-
secretary of SGBATOS argued that, “yes, meetings were often heated” and 
“doors would be slammed”. Whether these differences constitute a genuine 
struggle for collective rights on the part of the union or merely a “lover’s 
tiff” (as implied by some of our interviewees) is a moot point. What is 
clear is that the union representing workers in the water sector has been 
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tor entirely in renegotiating the contract.
Reputation concerns of the company also have an effect on the 
sustainability of the contract. The concession is one of the largest 
and its success is important to the reputation of the consortium 
partners that are competing in global markets for water contracts 
(Alcazar et al. 2000, 32).
The extent to which efforts to protect the “reputation” of the firms that 
make up the Aguas Argentinas consortium mean a serious commitment 
to expanded service delivery, as opposed to continued manipulation of 
service targets and investment figures, remains to be seen.
virtually meaningless.
Aguas Argentinas has been able to capture both the state and labour, 
thereby anaesthetizing the main bodies that might have acted to keep 
its activities in check.  Even the June 2000 public hearing appears to 
have had limited impact, with concessions that were won at that meeting 
being effectively nullified by new tariff increases. A telling example of the 
lack of respect for the public hearing is the disinterested response of the 
International Finance Corporation’s representative in Buenos Aires when 
asked about the meeting in July 2000.  Not only was she unaware of the 
event but seemed to care little about its outcome despite the fact that the 
IFC has supported the concession with over US$500 million in loans. 
Even in the eyes of many of its proponents, the sustainability of the 
Buenos Aires concession seems far from certain. Alcazar et al. (2000, 2), 
writing for the World Bank, state that “information asymmetries, perverse 
incentives and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the long-run 
sustainability of the concession”. In their eyes the concession is salvage-
able but needs refinement. They go on to argue that efforts to save the 
concession by the government and the private companies will continue, 
not necessarily because of the need for securing clean water for all and 
improving environmental standards in Buenos Aires, but for reasons of 
reputation:
An important factor enhancing the credibility of the govern-
ment’s commitment to the concession was the concern of the 
Argentine government with its reputation in global financial mar-
kets. Menem’s market-oriented reforms had made the economy 
open and introduced a currency board that fixed the peso to 
the dollar. This openness to global economic influences meant 
that any future federal executive would be concerned about how 
foreign private investors might react should government renege on 
the regulatory promises it had made to Aguas Argentinas as part 
of a large and visible transaction. Reputation can be a powerful 
tool for contract enforcement, but also somewhat ephemeral. In 
this case, the force of reputation would depend on how salient 
investors perceived the concession contract to be when compared 
to other reputation factors, as well as whether the firm appears to 
have reneged on its part of the bargain. As we shall show…the 
executive branch has intervened repeatedly to support Aguas 
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ENDNOTES
1 A much smaller Maoist group, the Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC), 
also exists but will not be discussed in the context of this paper.
2 SGBATOS is the Union for the Water Sector Workers of Gran Buenos 
Aires which itself is a part of FENTOSS, the National Federation of Water 
Workers. Both are in turn affiliated with the CGT, the General Confedera-
tion of Workers, the main umbrella labour movement referred to at the 
outset of this paper.
3 Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas (Latin Amer-
ican Foundation for Economic Research).
4 One interesting aspect of the figures is the five-percent share acquired by 
the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank group. 
The IFC originally lent money to Aguas Argentinas before exchanging these 
debts for a share in the company. Not only does it testify to the instant 
profitability of the firm (the IFC wanted a share in these profits), it raises 
questions about the objectivity of World Bank research of the privatization 
initiative. It also makes the Bank’s aggressive promotion of the Argentinian 
model abroad problematic.
5 Quilmes became part of the concession area in 1995 raising the total 
population to 9,300,000.
6 The figures quoted for this range from 4,663,670 (Aguas Argentinas 1998) 
to 4,900,000 (Aguas Argentinas 2000). The concession contract (perhaps 
the most reliable source) states that 58 percent of the population was 
connected to the sewerage network. This works out to 4,976,400 of the 
population with a connection to the sewerage network.
7 Aguas Argentinas argues that prior to privatization water coverage was 
67 percent and sewerage coverage at 54 percent, suggesting even greater 
levels of improvement.
8 Primary treatment merely involves the settling out of undissolved solids 
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from suspension in the form of sludge. Secondary treatment involves bring-
ing the effluent into contact with oxygen and microorganisms. This breaks 
down much of the organic matter to harmless substances.
9 It is interesting to note the researchers’ exaggeration of connection rates 
in this case. The figure of 83 percent was not reached until 2000.
10 In the poorer areas of the city, average household incomes are in the 
range of US$200-245 per month.
11 According to Americo García, Jr’s submission to the public hearing in 
June 2000, the figures for England and Wales are as low as 6-7 percent and 
the international average between 6.5 and 12.5 percent.
12 Since the public hearing these plans have been revised slightly but it 
remains unclear whether increased investments will actually be forthcom-
ing.
13 Indeed one interviewee from ETOSS denied that disconnections even 
took place. Aguas Argentinas on the other hand preferred to talk of service 
“regularization” rather than disconnections.
14 The period allowed between the first connection and disconnection in 
the residential sector is 180 days.
